A hard setback for Milei: Defeat in the Buenos Aires province, a call for reflection

In the legislative elections held on September 7, 2025 in the province of Buenos Aires, Argentina, voters renewed 46 provincial deputy seats, 23 senator seats and councilors in 135 municipalities. It is difficult not to nationalize these elections, since this province, which represents 37% of the national electoral roll with more than 13 million eligible to vote, is the most populous and economically influential district in the country, a historic stronghold of Peronism (the political movement founded by Juan Domingo Perón in the 1940s, characterized by its emphasis on state interventionism, populism and a strong network of clientelism).

These elections were crucial because they functioned as a plebiscite on the management of President Javier Milei, a libertarian economist who with La Libertad Avanza (LLA) - his political party - took office in December 2023 promising to dismantle the corrupt "political caste" and implementing what he described as the "chainsaw," a major adjustment to combat Argentina's chronic inflation and economic stagnation.

A bad result here could erode its governability ahead of national midterm elections in October 2025, where part of the federal Congress will be renewed. Milei, who in the 2023 presidential election surprised many by winning in this same province with 52.54% of the vote in the runoff against Peronist Sergio Massa (47.46%), allied this time with PRO, the party of former president Mauricio Macri, to try to repeat the success. But it did not work.

The results were a resounding setback: with 98.96% of the ballots counted, the Peronist alliance Fuerza Patria - led by Socialist Governor Axel Kicillof - obtained 47.28% of the votes, while Milei's La Libertad Avanza (LLA) was left with 33.71%, a loss of almost 19 percentage points with respect to its presidential performance in the province. Milei acknowledged the clear defeat and promised to redouble his efforts, but the blow resonates in the markets and in his support base. Sources such as La Nación and Infobae from Argentina confirm these numbers, highlighting how Peronism won in 99 out of 135 districts and in six out of eight electoral sections.

LLA's mistakes

Beyond the numbers, this defeat reveals structural flaws in Milei's project that, if not corrected, could squander what many see as the last chance for Argentina to escape decades of populist decline and become a normal country, with stable institutions and sustained growth. Disarming the economic and social bomb left by the Kirchnerist current of Peronism - the most leftist and clientelist wing, led by former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner - is a titanic task, and Milei warned them about it from the beginning: the road would be complex and painful, with impacts on pensions, salaries and subsidies, because it implies a distorted economy where what was free was paid for with poverty, hunger and galloping inflation.

And Milei must be credited with significant achievements: he stopped imminent hyperinflation, achieving the lowest rate in five years (2.4% in February 2025), he eliminated the usual roadblocks orchestrated by poverty managers disguised as social organizations, and began to dismantle the businesses of mafia-like unionists who for decades plundered the country. He is a brave president who knows what he is doing in economic terms and positions himself on the right side geopolitically with his close alliances with the United States and Israel, but that does not take away the mistakes that he must urgently correct.

There was overconfidence about the Government's achievements, but communication failed in sensitive cases.Leandro Fleischer

The first mistake was to allow La Libertad Avanza to be filled with legislators and figures that do not commune with its libertarian ideas, many of them Peronists or politicians of the old caste that Milei criticizes so much. This started from the top, with vice president Victoria Villarruel, who has been criticized from Mileism for her closeness to Peronist symbols, such as the photo she posted in October 2024 with Isabel Martínez de Perón (last wife of the Argentine tyrant) on Peronist Loyalty Day during a meeting in Madrid, Spain, her role as president of the Senate in the controversial increase of senators' salaries in the midst of adjustment, and even publicly criticizing some cuts, etc. Their only common ground seems to be anti-communism, but the tensions between the two were predictable and have derived in public fights that wear down the Government.

Downplaying this, arguing that what is important is Milei and his economic plan, was a serious mistake: these opportunists use the party to gain access to power and then betray the founding ideas, voting for populist policies that perpetuate waste and opposing painful but necessary measures proposed by the president.

The consequences of admitting these infiltrators in a hurry - only for their popularity or to add votes - manifested in a fierce internal struggle. Legislators formed their own blocs, and the Argentine political system, with its complexity and need for alliances, exacerbated the lack of control. Yes, the argument that the system is a mess that forces them to make pacts with too many devils is valid, but the result of doing it in a hurry are childish and circus-like fights that tire voters and dilute the anti-caste message.

In assembling the lists of candidates for these elections, the president's sister, Karina Milei -secretary general of the Presidency -, together with Sebastián Pareja, president of LLA in the province, prioritized names of the old political guard, leaving out young influencers and digital activists who had supported the campaign since its beginnings, backed by Santiago Caputo, a strategist close to Milei. This generated more internal friction.

Worse, Karina Milei has accumulated so much power that decisions such as the expulsion of Ramiro Marra -a popular and charismatic figure of LLA - for personal disagreements with her, while she has as her right hand a former Kirchnerist like Pilar Ramirez, have weakened the movement. Marra was seen as a pillar, but his departure highlighted how Milei's initial success was due more to his charisma and disruptive proposals, after the disastrous government of Alberto Fernández and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, than to his sister's political arming. Blindly trusting relatives may be human and it is important, but in politics it is necessary to take more things into account.

Overconfidence

Even the alliance with the PRO was not enough to counteract these problems. There was an excess of confidence because of the Government's achievements, but communication failed in sensitive cases. Accusations of corruption against Karina for alleged kickbacks in purchases of medicines for the disabled, along with complaints about cuts in funding for disability and the Garrahan children's hospital, were amplified by an opposition media campaign that appealed to emotional sensitivity. Although these scandals could be political operations - and the cuts seek to eliminate populist waste - they were not well explained to the public. In a province with high poverty rates, the necessary economic measures hit hard, and the lack of a clear message amplified discontent.

Another blow to Milei's image was the $LIBRA case, where he clumsily promoted in February 2025 a cryptocurrency that turned out to be a massive scam, generating judicial investigations in Argentina and the United States for possible illicit association. This was the beginning of the erosion of his image.

It has also been criticized that Milei fought with many of his allies, other political forces that supported some of his measures, perhaps due to overconfidence. This could be true in some cases, but what is certain is that one does not know what is behind the negotiations, and surely many of those members of the political caste imposed conditions that went largely against the Government's plan to straighten out the country.

Peronism should not be underestimated

Finally, the Peronist apparatus in the province of Buenos Aires should not be underestimated: it is well oiled by decades of short-term populism that delivers immediate benefits until the money runs out, at which time they perhaps lose power temporarily and then put sticks in the wheel to come back.

They are shrewd and organized; the Peronist mafia is not willing to give in, not even with former President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner serving a six-year sentence for corruption on house arrest since June 2025. For that reason, communication management is key, and in that it is failing: instead of explaining with empathy the necessary sacrifices and providing the necessary clarifications on the scandals, the Government is letting the opposition dictate the narrative.

Worse, they are turning Milei into a Perón-style figure - an idolized charismatic leader -, which is to be avoided at all costs if the goal is a normal country, not a cult personalist. Several currents are already forming in La Libertad Avanza that act in Milei's name without understanding or being interested in liberal policies, similar to how Peronism branched into factions that invoke the late tyrant just to maintain power. This is dangerous: it could transform LLA into a new Peronism, perpetuating the cycle of populism rather than breaking it.

Milei's government is indeed the last chance for Argentina to have a normal country. Milei alone is not enough; it is necessary to clean up the party, choose allies carefully, communicate the reforms better and avoid the cult of personality without ceasing to value and admire his figure. Otherwise, Peronism will return, and with it, the vicious cycle of crisis. It is essential that Milei does not let this opportunity pass: it is the last one.